



EVALUATION OF A SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Introduction
An optimal short-term plan can log ica lly  be only determined within 
the framework of a long-term plan. When a long-term plan has not been 
completed, practical sets of rules can be devised for a short-run plan 
(o f , say, two years); they providè a guide towards a best possible 
("second-best" but not "tenth-best") solution. In a short-run plan 
many bottlenecks must be accepted as unavoidable. In a more flex ib le  
long-term plan they can be changed. I f  the economic (rate o f  growth) 
and socia l (equality of opportunity) objectives aré given and the 
situation at the starting point is  known, short—term aspects of a long- 
run plan can be worked out. Standards for presentation of such programs 
are indicated below.
I. Diagnosis
1. National income, gross and net investment, average and marginal 
savings rates, foreign capital inflow, balance of payments.
2. Inventory of existing public investment and the absorptive 
capacity of the public sector.
3. Rough estimate o f existing excess capacity.
' 4* Occupational structure. Open and disguised, long— and short­
term unemployment; its  sectoral and regional distribution.
i>. Over-all judgment on bottlenecks to growth:
a) short-term bottlenecks (e .g .,  social overhead capital, shortage 
of skilled workers, balance o f payments, regional problems, 
socia l unrest);
b) longer term bottlenecks.
II. Categories of Priorities
1, Investment for  a fu ller utilization  o f  existing capacity 
(including projects in advanced process o f construction).
Such projects have obvious high, priority. They provide a
/"once f o r . . .
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"once for a ll"  increase in income—essential in a short term—but 
are not sufficient to  generate sustained growth.
2» Projects of "obvious" high priority  (which would have a high 
priority  in any long-term plan).
3* Projects ready for execution which are well prepared and meet 
strict criteria  (including shadow pricing, see I I I * l ) :
a) removing existing bottlenecks, b) short gestation period,
c) export gaining or import saving, d) near an optimum 
technological dimension which would stand up in a common market.
4* Labor-intensive projects designed for a rapid increase in 
employment (rural public works). See I I I . 1 . C  and I I I . 3 .
5. Social development projects:
a) Criteria: The relative importance of economic (rate of growth)
and social objectives has to  be evaluated. I f  too high a 
proportion of tota l investment were channeled into "social" sectors 
the rate of growth would be low. Social investments must be 
viewed, therefore, within the framework of tota l investment of 
which they should not form so high a proportion as to  reduce the 
rate of growth below an agreed minimum.
b) Distinction between projects with short- (vocational training, 
selective education projects) and long- (abolition of 
illite ra cy ) gestation periods. The productive efforts o f  a 
project determined by discounting the flow o f future benefits to  
present value, taking account of the gestation period. The 
social objective of equality of opportunity may ju stify  a 
somewhat higher priority . On the whole, however, the amount 
allocated for social investment should be determined residually.
III . Methods of Evaluation
Besides familiar cost-benefit calculations, three special problems 
deserve consideration:
1. Shadow-pricing (o f  general importance for  project-evaluation)
2. Adequacy of national e ffort (how to  increase savings)
/3 .  Employment (how
3o Employment (how to reduce unemployment without undue sacrifice 
of inccmeo)
10 Shadow-pricing (Precios de cuenta)
Market prices under perfect competition are a signalling device
steering economic resources into their optimum allocation,. Prices of
factors of production reflect then their opportunity costs and should
be equal to their marginal value productivity^ Competition, however*
and the investment market are imperfect in reality. Shadow prices of
three factors of production must be- used in the evaluation of an investment
program instead of market pricesB This is nob the place to expound
the full theory cf the subject-0 An excellent and succinct presentation
; - 1as available,, Three operational, points only may be mentioned:
i) Shadow prices are equal to the opportunity ccsts0 If there were 
only two goods in existence, the cost of one good is equal to that of 
the second good foregone,, ii) If there are more than two goods it is 
not so simple to identify the opportunity costs0 The shadow prices 
enable us in this case to measure them;, In the terminology of 
programming they are the Lagrange multipliers of a constrained 
optimization problem,, iii) To solve a constrained optimization 
problem for many sectors is a very complex task,, A good approximation 
can be obtained, however, by calculating the shadow prises of factors of 
productlúa for a simple two sector model and to apply them then for 
each of the many sectorso Shadow prices can be used, therefore, as a 
computational short-hand method for each project without having to solve 
each time the optimisation problem for the investment program as a whole, 
of which the project is a part- 0
While an exact determination of the shadow prices is not always 
possible, operationally useful approximations (within a lower and an
lo S» Cbs-kravarty, The Us3 of Shadow Prices in Programme 
Evaluation (CEÑIS, M.I»T„, Cambridege, 1961, India Project C/Ó1-2S),
/upper limit)
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upper limit) can be calculated,, They are indispensable for the. 
elaboration of an investment program in underdeveloped countries,.
Since conditions change in the course of development a time path 
of shadow prices has to be assumed for a long-run pian0 This does
not apply in the case of a short-term (two years) plan0
a) The shadow rate of interest
Capital should not be invested in a project if thereby the
ooppcrtunity is foregone of investing in another more profitable project;
Since capital markets aie notoriously imperfect the market rate of
interest does not reflect these mere profitable investment opportunities
foregoneo An approximate shadow rate of interest should therefore, be
used a3 a computational shorthand in order to rank projects0 The lower
limit of shadow rates of interest in Latin America is arcund Ô - 12
2/per cent, say, 10 per cento -/ No project should be included in the 
investment program which would not cover interest costs cf, say, 10 
per cento
Private investors follow this rule in practice,. No investment 
project is undertaken, if it does not promise a return of 15 — 20 
per cento Public investment projects, however, neglect in general
2 '  Using 1M4, Solow* s formula (as an approximation) the shadow rate of 
interest i s -
-e*g 1 — D 97.R ■> _ W
D
where is the rate of interest, g is the rate of growth, is the 
savings rate of the profit receivers,tf'W is the savings rate of the 
wage earners, and D is the share of profit income in. total income -,
Vie guess that in a "typical" Latin American country ¿ 3  varies between 
55 - 7 5 % 9 p between 15 - 3QS, W between 3 - 6 % *  '
Assuming a rate of growth (g) of A0 5/o_, /S? 65%, R — 2C
the raie of interest __L 05 _ _____ « Ao5 « 8,6% (rounded)
0o20 ■*> 1 - 0*65 bo523
0,65
If the rate of growth were 5$, the rate of interest under these 
conditions would be 9C6%<,
/ shadow-pricing
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shadow-pricing-— 'with grave consequences of waste of capital. Faulty 
allocation leads to the selection of wrong projects, wrong 
technologies, wrong location, wrong pricing of the product™and to 
insufficient savings of public enterprises, which should contribute 
to the national capital formation»
Electric power may be used instead of numerous other examples0 
Á shadow rate of interest of 10 por cent will in many cases lead to 
the substitution of thermal for hydro-electric projects, to a location 
of thermal projects nearer to the market than the often distant 
hydro-electric projects, and to higher tariffs for electric power»
Where specific subsidies are justified, they should be granted from 
the general budget0 It is wasteful and too costly to give them 
indiscriminately bo those who need it and to those who do not need it 
through lower prices of electric power0 Prices which do not reflect 
costs cause a direct waste of resources (via lost profits,}: and an 
indirect increased and continued waste by inducing the location of 
pow^istensive industries in high-cost areas0
In general, shadow rates of interest will give a lower ranking to 
capital-intensive and long-gestation period projects0
b) The Shadow Rate of Exchange
Foreign exchange must be considered as a specific factor of
production in underdeveloped, countries» Low price elasticities of
exports and imports are the cause of a foreign exchange market which
either works imperfectly cr works at an excessive expense of income
growth» The scarcity of foreign exchange should be reflected in a
shadow rate of exchange-which is highsr* than the market rate of exchange»
In various Latin American countries shadow price of exhange can be 
estimated at 1.0 - 50 per cent above the market rats» They give a
measuring rod for the need of imporb—savirigs and. export-gaming »
While it is still uneconomical to produce bananas on the North Pole,
shadow rates of exchange indicate to what extent projects, which
3/ The ’ase o f an accounting price o f foreign exchange is  not 
necessarily a giiosiiiutq for  dévaluai-ion ; i t  does not imply that 
devaluation is  necessary»
/produce goods
-  ó -
produce goods at- costs h3.gher than prices o f equivalent imported goods, 
should be included in the national investment program*
G) ."the Shadow Rate o f Wages
Where there is  open and disguised unemployment shadow rates of 
wages are markedly lower than the market rates* Theoretically the 
shadow rates o f wages (Lagrange m ultiplier) is  zero in such eases*» 
Operationally, however, an "incentive shadow rate o f wages" is  
necessary in  order to induce the unemployed to  work and to  take account 
o f  the fact that the families o f the unemployed w ill not save a l l  they 
gave their family members as support, once those found an occupation, 
but w ill increase th eir  consumption, Many projects which would not 
meet the cr ite r ia  o f p riority  i f  market rates o f wages are assumed, 
should nonetheless be included in the development program on the basis 
of shadow rates o f wages which are 20 -  50 per cent lower than the 
market rates8 These should be primarily labor-intensive projects 
which use l i t t l e  or no capital* An important example are. Rural Public 
Works ( I I .4) (fencing, bunding, terracing, digging for minor irrigation ) 
which use l i t t l e  capital and increase the productivity of the land, 
although at f i r s t  they do not produce an increase in agricultural 
goods* I f  the workers liv e  in v illages and work nearby a wage rate 
lower than the market rate may induce them to  work* I f  they work 
away from th eir  homes a market rate o f wages might be paid and subsidies 
would be justified* (For other examples and a fu ller discussion, see
III.-3. ) »
The timing of such projects and good diagnosis o f the unemployment 
situation is  important here* Disguised unemployment is  not ample in 
most South American countries and is  mostly concentrated in a few regionsc 
It may not be very important in five  years7 time—  but i t  is  a v ita l 
problem for  any short-term program at presente
4o PoM. Rcsenstein—Rodan, Disguised Unempl oyment end Undec-Smpioyment 
i n Agriculture (CENIS, M.IUT ., Cambridge, 195o, Ita ly  Project c756~25)o
/2 .  Adequacy o f
2» Adequacy of National  E ffort
a) Foreign aid should only add a proportion to  the national, 
capital formationo I f  the national e ffo rt  is  inadequate only a small
amount or no aid qbotild be forthcomings The better the national 
e ffort and the nation?s absorptive capacity the higher w ill  be the 
amount o f foreign aid® Air important task o f the Development Plan is* 
therefore, to evaluate the national e ffo rt  and to propose measures apt 
to  increase it>0
The best symptom and measure of national e ffort is  the average 
and marginal rate of savings—and notably the deviation between the 
two rates». An underdeveloped country with a low income per head may 
not be able to  save a high proportion o f her, income; her average rate 
o f savings may vary from 5 *- # per centQ It can save, howevers a very 
much higher proportion cut of her increase in income: her marginal rate 
o f savings can be twice or mere than twice as high (15 — 20 per cent) 
as her average rate of savings»
The mobilization of national e ffort must therefore be directed to  
raise savings» Three sources of savings had best be considered:
i )  Private savings» They can be increased by prospects o f
currency s ta b ility , by housing cooperatives savings associations-, 
and in  the long run by f is c a l  reforms exempting savings from 
taxation (expenditure tax)» While the average rate o f  savings 
i i  th is sector is 1 ~ 7 per cent, the marginal rate can be 
S -  12 per sent»
i i )  Corporate savings of the business sector are usually high 
already since the "ploughing back" of undistributed profits  
reinvests 2.0 — 35 peí’ cent of p ro fits . Ás development 
proceeds the proportion in the GNP of income, originating in 
th is sector w ill r ise , leading to  an increase in the national, 
savings rate,
i i i )  Savings in the public sector can be vastly increased even in 
the short run by making p ro fils  in public enterprises (seo 
Xlloloa on shadow pricing in the public sector) and by budget
/surpluses » Tills
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surpluseso This is  an essential part o f raising the national 
e f fo r t ; its  adequacy or inadequacy in the. short run w ill 
largely have to  be assessed on realisations in this sectors
b) While foreign aid can only form a part o f national investment, 
a higher proportion may be ju stified  in the in it ia l  period i f  proper 
measures are taken to  achieve high marginal rates c f  savings<-
3 o Employment and Unemployment
Full employment is  undoubtedly the f ir s t  step for  providing a 
minimum o f  equality o f opportunity and for  realising the objectives 
o f the Alliance for  Progress, Full employment in an underdeveloped 
country is  a structural problem quite different from that in developed 
countries. The con flic t  between productive e ffic ien cy  and greater 
equality in income distribution  makes i t  impossible to  realize a l l  socia l 
objectives overnight. Fortunately most South American (unlike Central 
American) countries are not heavily overpopulated0 To reach fu l l  
employment need not take as long a time as i t  must take, fo r  instance, 
in South East Asia, In the shorter interval, however, socia l growing 
pains o f an underdeveloped economy are una. void able. What matters
primarily is  net to  loss  sight o f the fin a l goal and to  see to  i t  that 
vested interests and inertia  should neither delay nor prevent its  
achievement. Some alleviating measures can make the path less painful 
even though they may well prolong it »  Economic development planning 
can both accelerate growth, :u e3, shorten the interval before a 
satisfactory  standard o f liv in g  for a l l  is  reached, and indicate the 
selection  o f some welfare measures which do not widen the interval 
excessively. The economic development operation is  unavoidably painful, 
but progress in economic knowledge in  the twentieth century can make i t  
shorter arid can provide anesthetics which did not exist in  the 
nineteenth century,
A higher rate o f growth w ill  in  the long run lead to mere employment. 
In the short run, however, there is  a con flic t  between "maximum 
output" and "maximum employment"» More labour-intensive but les3
/e ffic ien t methods
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e ffic ie n t  methods o f production can increase employment today at the 
expense o f producing a lower-value output, and notably less surplus 
which provides investible funds fo r  more output and emp3.oyir.ent 
tomorrow© A choice has to be made; mere employment in the 1960*3 
may mean less employment than would otherwise have been possible in 
the 1970's.
A ws]! thought-out development program can nonetheless 
substantially reduce the area o f con flic t  between "maximum output" and 
"maximum employment" through a serios o f measures :
a) A high shadow rate o f interest w ill encourage more labour- 
intensive methods of production0 With the exception o f construction and 
road building; however, the e ffe ctiv e  varia b ility  o f  coe ffic ien ts  o f 
production in modern industry is  not great, although i t  is  not 
negligible in those parts o f industrial a ct iv it ie s  which deal with 
"handling and bringing" of raw materials and products. The practical 
e ffe cts  are, however, small in the short run.
b) Construction and road building o ffe r  a considerable range of 
choice between labour‘.-’and capital-intensive methods of production. 
Secondary roads can be bu ilt with a minimum o f fixod capital 
(bulldozers, earth moving equipment, e tc .)  and with p len tifu l labour. 
They may not cost appreciably less per km. since the savings on fixed 
capita l are eaten up by very much higher maintenance coats—such roads 
may have to be repaired every year-—but they provide p len tifu l 
employment. The seme may apply to  the construction of hydro-ciectric 
barrages. It is  important to  overcome two obstacles to  the realization 
o f such a program which can have a considerable impact on employment in 
the short runs
i )  Secondary labour-intensive rcad3 take a very much longer time 
for  their construction. A long-run road-building plan must 
exist i f  "hs/nd-’to-mouth1 decisions o f roads to be quickly 
bu ilt are to  be eliminated,
i i )  Contractors prefer capital-intensive methods of production
/since they
since they reduce problems o f labour—handling end labour 
supervision. If' they are offered "cost plus p ro fit"  
contracts, they w ill choose laboui'-oxbensive methods o f 
production. Contracts for  secondary road building must 
therefore specify  a .labour-intensive method, o f production,
c) While 90 per cent or more of to ta l investment wild, be channeled 
into e ffic ie n t  agricultural, and industrial sectors, which are the 
foundation fo r  a high rate o f  growth—“they may be insu fficient in the 
short run to  establish fu l l  employment0 A special e ffort in drive 
and organization as well as a small part of investible funds ( 5 - 1 0  
per cent) should be diverted into Rural Public Works (see 11,4 and I I I ,  
l sc) which contribute to agricultural capital formation without at f ir s t  
producing more agricultural products, Such a ctiv it ie s  absorb very 
l i t t l e  capital goods cr foreign exchange but they can usefully employ 
many of the disguised unemployed in rural areas. Out o f the wages 
paid to  the additionally employed in Rural Public Works—up to  one-half 
w ill be spent on food (which can be obtained i f  needed by P.L0 480 
surplus products) and another 25 -  30 per cent on home produced wage 
goods (tex tiles  and household goods). There is  no doubt that resources 
for  th is  form o f useful employment-creating a ct iv it ie s  can fce found.
The real problem, here is  organization rather than cap ita l. To create 
i t  is  an urgent task o f the shoï't-run plan,
d) Timing o f modernisation projects is  fin a lly  a part o f the short- 
run plan. I f  unemployment exists in an area then employment-reducing 
and efficiency-increasing projects may have to  bs postponed unless 
additional employmeniy-creating projects are su ffic ien t to  absorb mere 
than the numbers o f displaced workers. Thus supe r—mark et s may have
to  bo delayed even though they may reduce the cost o f liv in g  and thereby 
stimulate in the longer run. an expansion in other industries. The 
same may apply to modern factories displacing handicrafts.
/TV, Economic Policy
IV» Economic Policy as an Instrument of 5hort.~Term Growth
Any purposeful development program consists o f two main parts:
A0 "What is  to  be done?" (often outlined sketchily in  a "Framework
for  Development")
B„ "Hew is  i t  to  be done?"
Objectives, p riority  cr iter ia  and evaluation methods fo r  project 
selection , and program composition do not su ffice  fe r  a sueceaful 
implementation o f the Flan (Part B)0 A coherent well coordinated 
economic policy  must be used throughout as a purposeful instrument o f 
growtb.o A functional economic policy  fo r  growth is  only another word 
S o t  development programming» It w ill have to  determine what part o f 
investment is  to  be undertaken in the public sector, but an even more 
important part o f i t  should consist in a system o f incentives and 
disincentives apt to  encourage or discourage private investment in 
certain sectors, regions or technologists— as w ell as providing 
e ffective  stimuli fo r  over-a ll savings and investment» Three main 
instruments may be considered:
1» Monetary Policy
a) Is a selective credit policy  possible in certain countries? 
Can i t  secure, for  instance, a su fficien t supply o f credit 
fo r  a fu lle r  u tiliza tion  of existing capacity (see I I „ l )  cr 
to  discriminate successfully between credit fo r  productive 
investment and for  consumption? Can i t  provide good 
agricultural credit supply as well as cred it fo r  small 
enterprises and handicrafts?
b) Methods o f avoiding either in flationary cr deflationary 
pressure®
c) Methods to  reduce an undue balance o f payments d e f ic it ,  ©tc0 
stco
2o Fiscal Policy
a) Tax measures to  stimulate savings (see IIIC2) including a 
budget surpluso
/b )  Tax measures
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b) Tax measures as incentives and disincentives for  
investments in different sectors (fo r  instance, a 
''discriminatory1' high tax on luxury buildings, and a 
low tax on cheap building) * 
e) Over—a ll  f is c a l  policy  to  achieve stability-, etc* etc*
3o Wage P olicy ..
Monetary and f is c a l  policy  alone may not su ffice  to  achieve 
growth and stability* A socia l consensus must be bu ilt up on 
principles o f a wage policy* This is ,  however, only possible in the 
long run0
Uo Commercial Policy
The degree of a selective infant—industry protection must be 
determined, taking the shadow rate o f exhange into account (see HI.l*b<,)<
5a Incentives for Smal l  Enterprise
Construction o f industrial estates or sones, besides credit and 
f is c a l  incentives* Industrial extension service,,
60 Form o f Desirable Cooperation with Private Foreign Investment
-V0 Organisation and Planning
lo For short* -term 
20 For long-term
The institu tional organisation of planning may have to  be different
in various countries* Experience from inside and outside Latin
American should be examined,
VÏ* Form and Amount o f t̂echnical. Assistance
What measures can be taken to  improve and accelerate the preparation 
o f projects ,
VII* Action during the Shor t -Run fo r the Preparation o f _,the
Long- 'Hun. Development  Program
Paul lio senst ein-kodan
